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Abstract: Relaxing an internal constraint of an individual at early stages of life is an 
approach that complements traditional policy interventions aimed to alleviate poverty. 
The Compassion International child sponsorship program focuses their work on the 
emotional, social, and spiritual development of sponsored children. This study 
investigates the impacts of child sponsorship on the quality of life and social behavior of 
sponsored children using age-eligibility as an instrument for sponsorship, a time 
preference experiment and a trust game. The study looks specifically at self-esteem, 
optimism, social trust, educational outcomes, patience and reciprocity of 286 sponsored 
children and 234 non-sponsored children between the ages of 4 and 23. The study also 
implements an innovative way of constructing summary indices using a method proposed 
by Anderson (2008). Results reveal child sponsorship does not have an effect on the 
quality of life of sponsored children. In fact, sponsored children seem to have less 
patience and reciprocate less than non-sponsored children. However the exploration of 
impacts by age shows that the program increases the self-esteem and optimism on 
sponsored children between the ages of 4 to 14.  
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1. Introduction 
During the last four decades, greater efforts have been taken to reduce child mortality, 
to increase children’s access to education, and to free children from labor.  In spite of all these 
efforts, millions of children are still living in impoverished circumstances and continue to miss 
out on their childhood. The vast majority of programs that seek to improve the living 
standards of the poor have aimed to relax external constraints through conditional or 
unconditional policy interventions. Currently, there is an alternative approach that 
complements the former intervention by relaxing the internal constraints of individuals. This is 
executed by modifying subjects’ beliefs and aspirations, especially at the early stages of life 
(Dalton, Ghosal, & Mani, 2010). In this regard, the Compassion International (CI) child 
sponsorship program focuses work on the emotional, social and spiritual development of 
sponsored children.  
The spiritual development of this intervention has left some critics to compare this to 
religious brainwashing (Yuen, 2008). This research will not concentrate on finding empirical 
evidence to either sustain or deny such criticism. Instead, the study will focus on measuring the 
psychological and behavioral impacts of child sponsorship and to add to the global empirical 
findings of the effects of the CI child sponsorship program. Previous studies of former 
sponsored CI children revealed positive and significant effects on their education, probability of 
employment and occupational choice (Wydick, Glewwe, & Rutledge, 2011). Moreover, a follow 
up study in Kenya on adult life outcomes disclosed that sponsored children, when compared 
with their non-sponsored siblings, scored higher on an adapted Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(Ross & Wydick, 2011). These empirical results seem to align with teachings found in Proverbs 
22:6 “Train up a child in the way he should go; even when he is old he will not depart from it” 
(New International Version). 
This research contributes to previous studies on the effects of relaxing internal 
constraints in children in addition to the literature on relaxing external and internal constraint 
to help the poor escape from poverty. This study differs from previous research because of its 
location and the addition of a time preference experiment, a trust game and the use of summary 
indices to measure the quality of life outcomes. Thus, the study not only captures the impact of 
the child sponsorship program on self-esteem, optimism, social trust and educational outcomes 
of sponsored children, but also compares these results with the behavioral responses of patience 
or impatience and reciprocity obtained with the experiments. In measuring the quality of life, 
this study follows closely the methodology used by Ross and Wydick (2011) in a similar 
analysis conducted in Kenya.  
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In this study, the subject pool consisted of a total of 520 children that included 286 
sponsored children and 234 non-sponsored children. In the non-sponsored group the youngest 
or oldest non-sponsored sibling of a sponsored child and children from the sponsor waitlist 
were comprised. The age range of the surveyed children was 4 to 23 years old. The empirical 
analysis shows that child sponsorship does not have an effect on the quality of life of sponsored 
children and that sponsored children seem to have less patience and reciprocate less than non-
sponsored children. Nonetheless, the exploration of impacts by age where the age of children 
was constrained between the ages of 4 to 14 displays a positive and significant impact of child 
sponsorship on the self-esteem and optimism of sponsored children.  
The following sections of this research include a literature review in Section 2, a 
description of the fieldwork, the surveys and the experiments in Section 3. The empirical 
methodology used in the analysis of the collected data is described in Section 4. Section 5 
contains the empirical analysis and the exploration of impacts by age analysis and Section 6 
summarizes and concludes.   
2. Related Literature 
2.1 Relaxing External and Internal Constraints 
 The literature on interventions aimed to relax external constraints in children has 
primarily focused on educational outcomes. In Kenya, the effects of school uniform distribution 
and deworming showed an increase in school participation of 0.064 and 0.14 years per treated 
child, respectively, as well as a significant reduction of absenteeism in both cases (Evans, 
Kremer, & Ngatia, 2009; Miguel & Kremer, 2004). The efficacy of these studies relies on the 
randomization of the intervention and on the identification of treatment impact by controlling 
for self-selection. In the same manner, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs like 
“Progresa” in Mexico are increasingly used as a major social policy instrument to alleviate 
poverty. The rise of school enrollment in Mexican youth during the first 15 months of 
Progresa totaled 3.4 percentage points with an increase of enrollment of more than 20 percent 
for girls and 10 percent for boys (Schultz, 2004; Skoufias, 2005). Progresa also had positive 
effects in improving health, delaying pregnancy, and increasing the productivity of human 
capital (Skoufias, 2005). The average cost of an additional school year for a Progresa child is 
$2,397, which is significantly higher than the $90.94 for a Kenyan child who participated in the 
uniform distribution program (Skoufias, 2005; Evans, et al. 2009).  
 Often times, sponsorship programs resemble CCT programs where human capital 
development is their essential component. CI sponsors 1.2 million children in 26 countries and 
provides a $38 contribution per sponsored child per month that is used to fund the sponsored 
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child’s education, food, and health expenses (Compassion International, 2013). The CI human 
capital development approach has been thoroughly evaluated in six different countries 
revealing that the average cost of an additional year of school for program participants is 
$1,284, which is lower than Progresa. The effect and outcome on the adult life of a former 
sponsored child when compared with their older non-sponsored siblings shows a 17.3 
percentage point higher probability of being a white collar-employee and an increase of 2.42 
years of additional education. The number of years is greater than the ones found in the 
Progresa study and the two studies in Kenya (Wydick et al., 2011). Moreover, the 
psychological impacts of CI depicts that a sponsored child has 0.924 points higher self-esteem, 
on adapted 5-20 scale from the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale1, when compared with their non-
sponsored siblings. Furthermore, they are 13.7 points more likely to expect a professional 
occupation, and anticipate to achieve 0.460 additional years of education (Ross & Wydick, 
2011).  
2.2 Self-Esteem and Reference Points 
 As the poor lose their desire to achieve goals, they no longer believe in themselves and 
they go through a process of hope denial (Moreira, 2003).  Thus raising the self-esteem of 
individuals can alter their beliefs about their own abilities and increase their aspirations and 
success. A positive correlation between self-image and wages found by Drago (2011) using the 
data on Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale administered to the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth corroborates Moreira’s statement. Furthermore, individuals that experienced positive 
feedback or derogated the source of negative feedback increased their self-esteem (Heathernon 
& Polivy, 1991). Hence, in order to reduce dissonance between the status individuals would like 
to achieve and what they can actually achieve, they need to adapt their beliefs and preferences 
to external conditions (Dalton et al., 2010). In turn, these external conditions or aspirations 
become their reference points. 
 Framing decisions around a reference point and making decisions under risk is an 
assumption of prospect theory (Khaneman & Tversky, 1979). Individuals are risk averse with 
respect to gains and risk acceptance with respect to losses. In this theory, when values are 
carried they represent switches in wealth rather than a final decision stage. Thus, an individual 
carrying his/her value experiences a perceptual apparatus alignment to the evaluations of 
changes or differences he/she confronts rather than to the evaluation of absolute magnitudes. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ross & Wydick (2011) first utilized this scale in their Kenya study, “The Impact of Child Sponsorship on Self-Esteem,  
Life-Expectations, and Reference Points: Evidence from Kenya.” 
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In its graphical form the value function takes a sigmoid curve shape on which the concave side 
describes the gains and the steeper convex side describes the losses, reflecting risk aversion in 
the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. Thus an analysis of changes at the 
margin and holding monotonicity of the function shows that when facing a new reference point 
the shift of the function provides a higher marginal benefit in comparison to the marginal 
benefit of the starting reference point. This experience allows the individual to encode 
outcomes in reference point terms and differentiate between gains and losses, thus creating a 
framing effect that will lead them to persist longer in pursuing their new goal or aspiration 
even after falling short on reaching previous goals.  
 The decision process individuals make within their editing and evaluating stages is 
described by behavioral economic theory. Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999) assumed that when 
goals are used as reference points they do not alter expectancies or likelihoods, rather they alter 
the psychological value of outcomes. Results from experimental settings strengthen this 
assumption of alteration of values especially when comparing individual behavior under 
prospect theory and neoclassical theory. List (2004) suggests that the psychological effects of 
the learning process among inexperienced consumers reflect the behavior captured by prospect 
theory as consumers with intense market experience behave within a neoclassical framework. 
Additionally, applications of prospect theory are not only seen at the household or individual 
level but also at the government level when developing a more efficient decision-making 
process (March, 1987; Levy, 1992).  
2.3 Aspirational Capital and Life Satisfaction 
 Reaching aspirations set as reference points allows individuals to achieve life satisfaction 
that in turn increases society’s well-being. At the individual level, life satisfaction is correlated 
with happiness. However, happiness has a strong dependency upon relative levels of income 
which can prolong the trap from which the subject is trying to escape (Clark & Oswald, 1995). 
This assumption is the description of an individual whose aspirations are moving in accordance 
with their reference points, and thus portrays a shift in the value function. Conversely, life 
satisfaction gives a skewed assumption of the level of happiness since it varies for each 
individual. A CI study carried out in Bolivia found that former sponsored individuals who had 
10 years of completed sponsorship have an additional 1.5 points on a life satisfaction scale and a 
4.1% or 5.5% increased probability of scoring higher life satisfaction when compared with non-
sponsored individuals (Ramirez, 2011). This increase reflects a brighter future; however, there 
is a need for a more rigorous analysis of causality at the aggregate level of life satisfaction. 
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Development of aspirational capital in individuals that are without the means to reach 
their goals helps create hopes independent of their seen or unseen impediments. These 
individuals in turn increase their capability to lead lives that they have reason to value and to 
improve their opportunities (Yosso, 2005; Sen, 1999). At the collective level, the increase of 
aspirational capital reflects an integrated approach of economic and social development that has 
been studied. Moreover, this behavior has the potential to create positive externalities by either 
establishing or increasing trust among community members, which leads to the development of 
social capital (Fukuyama, 1995).  
2.4 Trust, Reciprocity and Patience 
 Cooperation, trust, reciprocity and altruism are often used interchangeably to describe 
and measure economic impacts of policy interventions on the well being of communities. 
Unfortunately, survey questions that measure social capital have been criticized for introducing 
biases that limit their credibility. Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (1999) showed 
that the General Social Survey (GSS) trust questions are highly correlated with the ratio of 
money returned in a trust experiment, thus, suggesting that survey questions about trust 
predict trustworthiness and not trust. On the contrary, to directly measure and empirically 
explore the effects of social capital on altruism, trust and reciprocity, Carter and Castillo (2002) 
conducted a trust experiment on which subjects played three different games, each time taking 
different positions (dictator, trustor and trustee). This setting allowed them to form an 
intrapersonal comparison measure that facilitated the distinction between trust and reciprocity 
from altruism and caring for others. Their findings exposed that in communities where there is 
imminent strong correlation between trust and reciprocity there is a sort of normative 
equilibrium among members and the levels of trust are stronger where reciprocity norms are 
most active. Moreover, experimental findings show that trust and cooperation fluctuations are 
influenced not only by demographic but also by associational factors (Carpenter, Daniere, & 
Takahashi, 2004). 
In the transition from childhood to adulthood, children and adolescents both experience 
decisions on which uncertainty and long-term consequences directly impact their lifelong 
outcomes. Relating experimental choices of patience to predicted field behavior of individuals 
could be used as a proxy of potential economic decisions. In a study of 661 children and 
adolescents from ages 10 to 18, Sutter, Kocher, Rutzler, and Trautmann (2010) found that their 
subjects’ choices are significant predictors of their behavior at an early stage in life. Thus, more 
impatient subjects are more likely to spend money on alcohol and cigarettes, are less likely to 
save money, and have a higher body mass index. Although time preference studies on children 
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are continually revised, the importance of corroborating expectation survey answers with 
behavior captured by a time preference experiment is necessary. Thus, this study aims to 
corroborate the effect on the quality of life obtained from survey answers with the effect on the 
social behavior captured using two field experiments of child sponsorship on sponsored 
children.  
3. Fieldwork, Survey and Experiments  
3.1 The Compassion International Program 
CI is a Christian faith organization founded in 1952, with the idea of providing Korean 
War orphans with food, shelter, education and health care, as well as Christian training. The 
program is a “Christian child advocacy ministry that releases children from spiritual, economic, 
social and physical poverty and enables them to become responsible, fulfilled Christian adults.”2 
CI sponsors over 1 million children from 26 countries providing an average contribution of $38 
per month per child.  
In Jakarta, Indonesia the program operates through a partnership system with local 
Christian churches. In every church, children meet every other afternoon during the weekdays 
and meet regularly on either Saturdays or Sundays. They receive academic tutoring, a nutritive 
meal, spiritual training and healthcare. Often times, children receive school uniforms as well as 
subsidizes for their school cost. The program also allows for the sponsor and the sponsored 
child to have direct channels of communication by the exchange of letters, photos and gifts.   
The selection of families with a potential sponsored child is not done at random in every 
church. Instead, the responsibility resides in one of the church leaders. Nevertheless, priority 
for sponsorship is given to orphans and children with a single parent. In every selected family, 
a potential sponsored child must be between the ages of 3 to 9 at time of enrollment in the 
program. Also, each family must not have more than two sponsored children, with the 
exceptions of twins with the same eligible age. Parents from a selected family ultimately take 
the responsibility of selection of a sponsor child among the age-eligible children. It is important 
to note that participant children are not required to be Christians to be eligible for sponsorship.   
3.2 Fieldwork and Survey   
The research was conducted in four churches, which will be referred to as sites ongoing, 
in Jakarta-Indonesia from May through July 2012. The participant sites were selected based on 
the year of when the child sponsorship program was rolled out in each site. As such, of the four 
selected sites, two started in February 2003 and two in February 2007. This selection 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Retrieved from http://www.compassion.com/about/about-us.htm  	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specification facilitates the creation of an instrumental variable (IV) for the empirical analysis of 
this research that is discussed in Section 4.  Furthermore, it exploits the age rule criteria for 
sponsorship of being between the ages of 3 to 9 at the time of enrollment in the program. Thus, 
resulting in a natural selection within participant families of one of the oldest eligible children 
for sponsorship.  
Each one of the selected sites provided us a list of sponsored and waitlisted children 
from where we randomly selected the subjects for the study. Of the selected children five 
subjects were not considered in the research due to being unable to answer questions because of 
age or because the subjects declined to participate in the research. The selection of a participant 
subject implied that his/her older or younger sibling was also selected. In this case, the family 
of each selected child decided which one of the two siblings they would bring to participate in 
the study. This resulted in a total survey sample of 520 children, from where 286 were 
sponsored children and 234 were non-sponsored children. The non-sponsored children group 
included the oldest or youngest non-sponsored sibling of a sponsored child and the waitlisted 
children. The age range for sponsored children was 5 to 18 and 4 to 23 for non-sponsored 
children. Figure 1 presents a kernel density of the age distribution for the total number of 
participant children. The selected children represented a total of 267 participant households for 
this study. 
Initially, the implementation of this study was intended to be at each one of the selected 
child’s home. However due to safety concerns not only of the participants but also of the 
researchers, selected children and their siblings were asked to come at a specific day and time to 
the site where they belong. Once a pair of children arrived to the site, they were greeted by one 
of the researchers and one of the two locally hired enumerators. The sponsored child was asked 
to step outside the room, and was assigned a drawing task whose analysis is not part of this 
study. The non-sponsored child was first administered a survey, followed by a time preference 
and a trust game experiment whose details are explained in Section 3.4. Once the non-
sponsored child finished these tasks, he/she was asked to leave the room and his/her sponsored 
sibling was asked to come into the room where he/she was administered the same survey and 
experimental games. In the same manner, children from the waitlist and his/her sibling 
followed the same procedure as the sponsored children and their siblings. The waitlisted child 
was asked to step outside the room while his/her sibling was administered the survey and the 
experiments. Once he/she finished with these tasks, his/her sibling was asked to come inside 
the room and the same survey and experiments were administered. 
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The administered survey incorporated questions about the children’s characteristics, 
parents’ marital status and his/her housing living conditions. It also included 5 self-esteem 
questions adapted from the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale questionnaire3, 3 questions of 
hopefulness about the future, 3 social trust questions adapted from the GSS questionnaire4, 4 
questions about spiritual depth and 11 questions about reference points for educational and 
employment expectations as well as the expected age of marriage and the expected number of 
children.  
3.3 Subjects Background 
The summary of statistics presented in Table 1 describes the data collected for the 
sponsored and non-sponsored children. This Table also shows the t-test results where the 
means of the sponsored children (treated) and the non-sponsored children (untreated) are 
compared. When comparing the control variables, the average age of the 286 sponsored 
children that participated in the study was 11 and the average age of the 234 non-sponsored 
children was 10. Thus, the difference in means of age is positive and statistically significant. In 
relation to the birth order, sponsored and non-sponsored children were the second child from 
each participating household and came from a family of 5 where both parents held the same job 
type, unskilled for mothers and semiskilled for fathers. Sponsored and non-sponsored children 
lived in houses where they had access to electricity and an indoor toilet. Moreover, the floors, 
walls and roofs were constructed using similar materials. However, the difference in means for 
the constructed house quality index showed a negative and statistically significant coefficient 
suggesting slightly higher living conditions for the non-sponsored children. Although, 
difference in means for enumerator, researcher and treated household are not presented in this 
table, they were also included as control variables in the analysis. In the same table the 
difference in means for the optimism index and expected level of education are positive and 
statistically significant; nonetheless, this significance disappears in the analysis presented in 
Table 3. 
3.4 Experiments  
3.4.1 Time Preference 
Once the survey was finished, the protocol for the time preference experiment was read 
to each child independently. In the experiment children were asked if they would prefer one 
chocolate in a week from today or three chocolates in a month and one week from today. Before 
a decision was made, each child was asked a set of questions to make sure the child 
comprehended the payoff implications of the different choices. Their decision was timed and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Questions retrieved from http://www.bsos.umd.edu/socy/research/rosenberg.htm 
4 Questions retrieved from http://www3.norc.org/gss+website/	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recorded in the answer sheet. The number of chosen chocolates was allocated inside a bag. This 
bag had the child’s name and the date when they could receive their chocolates. Every day one 
bag with chocolates and names was given to the site director, and he/she was responsible for 
giving the chocolates back to the children on the day they chose. The protocol and answer 
sheet for this experiment can be seen in Appendix A.  
3.4.2 Trust Game 
 The experimental game used to measure reciprocity was a modification of the Berg, 
Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) investment game in which players participated in a one shot 
game experiment as either Player A or Player B. For every selected couple of children, Player 
A was the sibling of a sponsored child and Player B was the sponsored child. In the same 
manner for the selected waitlisted children, Player A was the sibling of the waitlisted child and 
Player B was the waitlisted child. In cases where there were two sponsored children, a coin was 
flipped to decide who was Player A or Player B.  
Once players were selected, we asked Player B to leave the room. Then, we proceeded to 
read the protocol of the game to Player A, at the same time Player A was endowed with 3 
chocolates. Once the protocol was read, Player A was asked to decide how many of the 3 
endowed chocolates he/she wanted to give to Player B with the option of keeping all of them. 
Player A was also informed that for any number of chocolates he/she decided to give to Player 
B, the researcher will multiply this number by 3. Player A’s decision was recorded in a decision-
sheet and then Player A was asked to leave the room. See Appendix B for Player A protocol and 
decision sheet.  
Player B was then asked to come into the room. The protocol of the game for Player B 
was read and 3 chocolates were endowed to the player at the same time. At this moment, Player 
B also received any number of chocolates given by Player A (if any) plus the number of 
multiplied chocolates given by the researcher. The total number of chocolates Player B can 
have at this point of the game was the sum of the endowed chocolates and the number of 
chocolates given by Player A (if any, this number was multiplied by 3 by the researcher). The 
total potential number of chocolates Player B can have ranged from 3 to 9. Player B was then 
asked how many chocolates he/she would like to give back to Player A with the option of 
keeping all the chocolates. Player B’s decision was recorded in a decision-sheet.  Finally, Player 
A was asked to enter the room and any chocolates that Player B decided to return to Player A, 
were given to Player A. See Appendix C for Player B’s protocol and decision sheet. Figure 2 
presents a graphical representation of the Trust Game.  
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4. Empirical Methodology 
In order to facilitate the analysis of the effect of the CI child sponsorship program, the 
following hypotheses are framed:  
• H0: γ ≤	 0,  
CI does not have an effect on SE, OPTI, ST, PAT, RC of CSP 
• H1: γ > 0, 
CI has a positive effect on SE, OPTI, ST, PAT, RC of CSP 
Where SE represents self-esteem, OPTI represent optimist, ST represents social trust, 
RC represents reciprocity, PAT represents patient and CSP represents sponsored child.  
To capture the potential effect of the program an ordinary least-square (OLS) model 
with site fixed effects is used. Site fixed effect is incorporated in the model to control for 
potential heterogeneity among sites due to unobservable characteristics. As such, a least 
squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimator technique is used which allows the use of 3 site 
fixed effect dummies in the model5.  
The primary estimated model is as follows:   
Yij = αj + γSij + βXij + uij 
Where Sij is a dummy for current sponsorship (spn) of children i in site j, αj is the site fixed 
effect, and Xij is a vector of control variables that include age, gender, birth order, enumerator, 
researcher, size of the family, being in a treated household, mother and father’s occupation, and 
a house quality index6.  
 Due to the non-randomization of the program, endogeneity problems arise at the 
selection of households into the program as well as children within selected households. We 
address the former problem by only including families that were selected into the program. The 
later problem is addressed with the use of the natural instrument program roll out. This 
natural instrument exploits the age rule criteria for sponsorship of being between the ages of 3 
to 9 at the time of enrollment in the program and the natural selection within participant 
families of one of the oldest eligible children for sponsorship. As such, an instrumental variable 
(IV) was constructed that contained a vector of dummies that represented ages at which a child 
could have been sponsored during program roll out.  
The IV results in the following first-stage equation: 
Sij = αj + θXij + ψMij + uij 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Of the 3 site fixed effect dummies, 2 represent the sites and 1 represents the year on which the program was rolled out. 
6 House quality index includes roof material, wall materials, floor materials and dummies for having or not electricity and 
an indoor toilet. 	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Where Sij represents the probability of sponsorship for children i within a selected family j  and 
Mij represents the vector of dummies.  
 The second-stage equation then becomes:  
Yij = αj + γŠij + βXij + εij 
Where Yij represents one of the outcome variables from the potential effects of the program and 
Š is the instrumented probability dummy of being a sponsored child. To address a potential 
intra-household endogeneity due to selection among age-eligible children, the data will be 
clustered at the household level, thus obtaining robust standard errors.   
Similarly, to capture the potential effect of the program in the patience (PAT) of a 
sponsored child, the same model was used. However, in this case the model takes a linear 
probability (LP) form.  
In order to measure the quality of life, 3 summary indices were created and used as outcome 
variables Yij in our empirical methodology. In its essence a summary index pools multiple 
outcomes into a single index, which is a methodology that fits perfectly with the group of 
outcomes obtained from each question asked in the survey. Each index is a weighted mean of 
several standardized outcomes where the calculated weights maximize the amount of 
information captured in the index. The summary indices were constructed using the following 
steps suggested by Anderson (2008):  
• The outcomes signs where switched, when necessary so that a positive direction always 
indicated better outcome.   
• Each outcome was demeaned and converted to effect size7 so that the converted 
outcomes were normalized to be on a comparable scale.  
• Three grouping domains j were defined (Self-Esteem, Optimism and Social Trust) and 
in each domain the correspondent outcome questions   𝑦.were assigned 
• Three new variables Ε where created self-esteem index (SEI), optimism index, (OPTI) 
and social trust index (STI) which are the weighted average of the correspondent 
outcome questions for an individual i in one of the previously defined domains j. These 
outcomes were weighted by the inverse covariance matrix of the transformed outcomes 
from the defined domains. Formally, the process is as follows:   𝛦!" = (1!  Σ!!!)!!  (1!  Σ!!!𝑦!"), where Eij  represents one of the constructed variables, 1 is 
a vector column of 1’s,  Σ!!!  is the inverse covariance matrix of the transformed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This was accomplished by dividing each outcome to its control group standard deviation. In this study the non-
sponsored children are the control group.  
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outcomes in the defined domains, and  𝑦!" is a column vector of all outcomes for an 
individual i in domain j.  
5. Empirical Results  
5.1 Self Esteem (SE) 
 Table 2 presents the OLS estimations with site fixed effects whereas Table 3 presents 
the second stage results from the use of the IV with site fixed effects. In both analyses there is 
no evidence of a positive effect on the self-esteem of sponsored children. A further analysis 
using the instrumental variable and site fixed effects on each of the five self-esteem questions 
presented in Table 4 also shows no effect on each self-esteem question. However, age appears 
to have a positive and significant effect on self-esteem across all previous tables. Thus, Table 5 
explores the age effect by constructing 4 groups with different age categories and one group 
that includes subjects from 4 to 17 years of age. The data shows mixed results among the age 
groups. Age is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level for the 13 to 16 year old 
group, and negative and statistically significant at the 1% level among the 4 to 7 year old 
group. Furthermore, the Self-Esteem Index for the later group is negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level. This could be explained by the lack of comprehension of the self-
esteem questions among the children in this age group. In the same manner, the coefficients for 
the house-quality index, size of the family and researcher are positive and statistically 
significant in Table 3. On the contrary, in the same table and on Table 5, the researcher 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant. These results suggest that the living 
conditions and being a member of a family of 5, which is the mean for size of the family, impacts 
positively on the self-esteem of a sponsored child. However, a child may have perceived the 
presence of the researcher in the room, as a form of suppressing their self-esteem thus the 
coefficient is negative in this analysis. 
5.2 Optimism (OPTI) 
 The analyzed data shows no evidence of a positive effect on optimism of the sponsored 
children in the estimations presented in Table 2 and Table 3. However, in both tables males 
present a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 10% level. As with the self-
esteem analysis, in Table 6, the IV and site fixed effects is used to examine each of the questions 
asked to elicit optimist. No effects were found on two of the three questions asked. However, in 
the second question there is a positive and statistically significant effect of the child sponsorship 
program on sponsored children.8 Age remains significant and positive across Table 2, 3 and 6. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The question used to elicit Optimist: 1) I feel like the future holds good things for me, 2) I feel that when I am older I 
will have a good job with a good income 3) I feel that my life as an adult will be better for me than it was for my parents 
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Thus, Table 7 presents a further exploration using the same age groups constructed for the 
self-esteem analysis revealing that the age coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level among the 13 to 16 year age group. However, the coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for the 4 to 7 year age group. Similarly, the age 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level for the 4 to 17 year age group.  
5.3 Social Trust (ST) 
 As with the self-esteem and optimism analysis no evidence of a positive effect on the 
overall social trust of the sponsored children was found. Tables 2 and 3 presents the OLS and 
IV estimations with site fixed effects. In both tables age and gender are statistically significant. 
However, age has a positive coefficient and gender has a negative coefficient. This suggests that 
as age increases, children’s social trust also increases, and that a male child has less social trust 
than a female child.  A further analysis of the 3 GSS questions asked to the children is 
presented in Table 8. The data shows no positive effect on the sponsored children for the trust 
question or the fairness question. Nevertheless, the age coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level on the fairness question analysis. The helpfulness question analysis 
presents a negative and statistically significant effect at the 5% level on the sponsored 
children.9  Moreover, gender presents a negative and highly statistically significant coefficient 
suggesting not only a negative effect of the sponsorship program on the sponsored children, 
but also that a male child is less helpful towards others. Table 9 presents a further analysis of 
social trust using the 5 constructed groups of age. This analysis reveals no positive effects of 
sponsorship on the social trust of sponsored children. However, across all 5 constructed age 
groups gender holds a negative coefficient and is statistically significant for the 17 to 23 year 
age group.  
5.4 Educational and Employment Outcomes. 
 Table 10 presents the results from a t-test analysis of the educational expectation 
questions asked. The results show that fathers and siblings have a positive and statistically 
significant influence on the educational outcomes of sponsored children. Also, sponsored 
children expect to achieve higher educational outcomes when compared with non-sponsored 
children. Table 11 presents a further analysis of the expectation questions with the use of the 
IV where previously mentioned t-test results no longer hold. Nevertheless, this analysis shows 
that child sponsorship has a statistically significant impact on reducing the expected number of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The GSS questions used to elicit Social Trust: the trust question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?”, the fairness question "Do you think most people 
would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?", and helpfulness question "Would 
you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?".	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children a sponsored child anticipates to have from an untreated mean of 2.530. Conversely, 
Table 3 shows that the program has a negative and statistically significant impact on the 
expected job10 a sponsored child anticipates to have from an untreated mean of 2.478. This 
negative result could be influenced by the type of job a sponsor father has, which presented a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient in the same analysis.  
5.5 Patience (PAT) 
 The t-test result presented in Table 12 from the time preference experiment reveals no 
statistical significance on patience between sponsored and non-sponsored children. However, 
the IV estimations obtained in Table 13 shows a negative effect of the sponsorship program on 
the sponsored children’s patience. The coefficient for the sponsored children is negative and 
highly statistically significant all across the 5 constructed groups of age, except the 4 to 7 year 
age group. However, the treated household variable is positive and significant for the same 
groups of age except for the 4 to 7 year age group. Also, the researcher coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant across all age groups. These results suggest that despite the 
positive effect of being a member of a treated household, sponsored children are less patient 
when compared with non-sponsored children. These outcomes could potentially be influenced 
by the negative and statistical significant coefficient value found on the researcher variable, 
since children may have felt the pressure of behaving to impress them.  
5.6 Reciprocity (RC)   
 In Table 12, the t-test results for Player A and B participants on the trust game are 
presented. In the case of Player A, there is a positive and statistically significant difference 
between the sponsored children and the non-sponsored children. Nonetheless, for Player B 
there is a negative and statistically significant difference between the sponsored and non-
sponsored children. These results suggest that when a sponsored child plays the trust game as 
Player A, they have higher trust towards others when compared with a non-sponsored child. 
When they play the game as Player B, a sponsored child is less trustworthy of others, or 
reciprocates less when compared to a non-sponsored child.  
 To further explore this behavior an analysis with the IV and site fixed effects from 
previous outcome examinations along with the 5 constructed groups of age was used. Table 14 
presents the estimations for Player A where the data shows positive and statistically significant 
coefficients all across the 5 age groups for the sponsored child variable. Age is positive and 
statistically significant. Also, if a child is in the 4 to 7 year age group or the 4 to 17 year age 
group, the age coefficient is negative and statistically significant. The treated household 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Expected job was classified as: 3=Skilled, 2=Semiskilled, 1=Unskilled 
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coefficient is negative and statistically significant across all ages. Table 15 presents the 
estimations for Player B where the coefficients are negative and statistically significant across 
the five age groups for the sponsored child variable. In this analysis, age is not a significant 
coefficient but the treated household coefficient is positive and statistically significant for all 
ages.  
5.7 Exploration of Impacts by Age   
 This analysis was performed by constraining the age of children into different groups. It 
differs from the age effect analysis mentioned on previous paragraphs where each age group 
represents a dummy variable. The results presented in Table 16 show a statistically significant 
increase of self-esteem and the optimism of a sponsored child that is in between the ages of 4 to 
14, which represent 90% of the total sponsored children in the study. In this group, the 
sponsorship program increases 0.304 and 0.473 points on the aggregate self-esteem and 
optimism indices from the untreated means of -0.007 and -0.073.  These increases occurred 
within a scale of -1.87 to 1.72 for the self-esteem index and -2.60 to 1.04 for the optimism 
index. In this analysis, the results for the social trust index, expected level of education and 
expected job are not significant.  However, the time preference, Player A payoff and Player B 
payoff are consistent with the results found initially. 
6. Conclusion 
  Although previous studies on the effects of the CI child sponsorship program have 
found positive effects, the results obtained in this research do not show such evidence for the 
total group of children in the study.  In looking at the quality of life of the sponsored children 
measured by the constructed self-esteem, optimism and social trust summary indices, the 
sponsorship program does not improve any of these qualities. The age effect analysis, on which 
groups of age were constructed to control for age heterogeneity of children, corroborates the 
no effect outcomes obtained. However, the exploration of impacts by age indicates that child 
sponsorship has a positive effect on the self-esteem and optimism of sponsored children 
between the ages of 4 to 14. In relation to the educational and employment outcomes, the 
sponsorship program seems to not have an effect on sponsored children in this age group. This 
result suggests that the Compassion International child sponsorship program works more 
effectively on sponsored children who have been in the program for 6 to 10 years. 
The analysis of the social behavioral outcomes of patience and reciprocity captured with 
the time preference experiment and the trust game, mirror impatience and less reciprocity from 
sponsored children. However, the trust game also showed that sponsored children have a 
behavior of more trust toward others when compared with non-sponsored children. This result 
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is contradicted by the no effect results of the child sponsorship program in the analysis of the 
trust question and social trust. 
 A general claim of the no effect or no positive effect of the child sponsorship program 
cannot be made. In this study, participant children were part of a minority faith group and lived 
surrounded by a different and predominant faith. Moreover, the majority of children lived close 
to an urban environment where their living conditions are different from children whom live in 
rural areas, thus, their perspectives for quality of life and their social behavior can be different. 
From a traditional and experimental economics outlook, further studies to corroborate survey 
answers with those found in an experimental setting are necessary to accurately evaluate the 
effects of poverty alleviation programs. Lastly, in developing polices strong consideration of the 
religious and cultural background of not only the population but also of the region where the 
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2 
Initial Endowment:  
Player A: 3 choc 
Player B: 3 choc 
Step 1:  
Player A: 3-1 = 2 
Player B: 3+ (3*1)= 6 
Step 2:  
Player A: 2 
Player B: 6-2= 4 
Final Balance:  
Player A: 2 + 2= 4 choc 
Player B: 4 choc 










Variable( SPN obs NON-SPN obs diff*
Age 11.066 286 10.136 234 0.563*
(2.530) (4.100) (0.307)
Gender( 0.455 286 0.470 234 -0.016
(1=male) (0.499) (0.500) (0.044)
Birth(Order 2.186 285 2.267 232 -0.081
(1=first) (1.29) (1.20) (0.110)
Size(of(Family 5.392 286 5.487 234 -0.096
(1.394) (1.384) (0.122)
Mother(Job(Type 1.490 286 1.457 234 0.032
(3=Skilled;82=Semiskilled,81=Unskilled)8 (0.642) (0.642) (0.057)
Father(Job(Type 1.937 286 1.957 234 -0.020
(3=Skilled;82=Semiskilled,81=Unskilled)8 (0.477) (0.470) (0.042)
House(Quality(Index 8.962 286 9.098 234 -0.137**
(Scale85=10) (0.760) (0.788) (0.068)
Self-Esteem(Index 0.006 286 -0.007 234 0.013
(Scale8=1.8788to881.72) (0.552) (0.561) (0.049)
Optimism(Index 0.060 286 -0.073 234 0.133**
(Scale8=2.6088to881.04) (0.659) (0.046) (0.061)
Social(Trust(Index -0.001 286 0.002 234 -0.003





Expected(Level(of(Education 3.815 286 3.671 234 0.144***
(1=primary,2=middle, (0.500) (0.627) (0.051)
3=second,4=college,5=gradschool)
Expected(Job( 2.451 284 2.478 230 -0.028
(3=Skilled;82=Semiskilled;81=Unskilled) (0.714) (0.659) (0.061)
Expected(Marriage(Age 25.449 283 25.064 233 0.384
(3.874) (4.006) (0.349)




































spn !0.022 0.065 !0.026 0.100 !0.061 !0.063 1.750*** !3.672***
!(1,!sponsor;!0,!no!sponsor) (0.059) (0.076) (0.067) (0.063) (0.073) (0.057) (0.103) (0.211)
Age 0.0221*** 0.0596*** 0.0236*** 0.0228*** !0.008 !0.0225*** 0.0611*** !0.012
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.041)
Gender !(1=male) 0.018 0.110* !0.110** !0.002 !0.510*** 0.036 0.192 !0.201
(0.048) (0.058) (0.056) (0.048) (0.061) (0.040) (0.119) (0.298)
Birth0Order0 (1=first) !0.026 0.034 !0.010 0.009 !0.009 !0.013 0.041 !0.234
(0.026) (0.033) (0.028) (0.024) (0.032) (0.024) (0.052) (0.162)
Enumerator 0.081 !0.129** !0.071 0.115** 0.101 0.070 0.128 !0.186
(0.050) (0.060) (0.056) (0.049) (0.062) (0.048) (0.079) (0.248)
Researcher !0.0951* 0.011 !0.011 0.031 0.031 !0.0913* 0.018 !0.244
(0.049) (0.061) (0.056) (0.046) (0.061) (0.047) (0.080) (0.255)
Size0of0Family 0.0419* 0.019 0.020 !0.030 0.008 0.023 0.008 0.090
(0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.021) (0.041) (0.138)
Treated0household 0.084 0.075 !0.014 0.052 0.081 0.078 !1.236*** 2.317***
(0.069) (0.089) (0.084) (0.082) (0.092) (0.068) (0.123) (0.275)
Mother0Job0Type 0.000 0.022 !0.017 !0.018 !0.039 0.038 !0.006 !0.057
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.043) (0.045) (0.041) (0.035) (0.050) (0.036) (0.063) (0.199)
Father0Job0Type !0.023 !0.016 !0.055 !0.021 0.116** 0.024 !0.011 0.188
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.059) (0.058) (0.057) (0.049) (0.057) (0.047) (0.080) (0.266)
House0Quality0Index0 0.0877** !0.001 0.042 0.026 !0.038 0.034 !0.005 0.209
(Scale!5=10) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) (0.031) (0.057) (0.166)
FE,0dS20(dummy) 0.133** 0.189** !0.099 !0.075 0.158** 0.112* 0.227* !0.408
(0.065) (0.085) (0.078) (0.065) (0.079) (0.067) (0.117) (0.371)
FE,0dS3!(dummy) 0.030 !0.044 0.136 0.185** !0.079 !0.069 !0.126 0.530
!0.081 !0.086 !0.083 !0.073 !0.091 (0.067) (0.114) (0.336)
FE,0dYear0(dummy) 0.105 0.135 !0.202** !0.207*** 0.090 !0.023 0.575*** !1.294***
!0.083 !0.099 !0.092 !0.079 !0.095 (0.079) (0.122) (0.382)
Constant !1.301*** !1.000** !0.376 3.379*** 2.772*** 0.014 1.528*** 6.696***
(0.363) (0.418) (0.435) (0.391) (0.427) (0.312) (0.553) (1.780)
Observations 517 517 517 517 511 449 514 514





























spn !0.059 0.215 !0.089 0.140 !0.218* !0.327*** 1.669*** !3.891***
!(1,!sponsor;!0,!no!sponsor) (0.114) (0.136) (0.126) (0.102) (0.129) (0.114) (0.228) (0.533)
Age 0.0215*** 0.0618*** 0.0226** 0.0234*** !0.010 !0.0270*** 0.0599*** !0.015
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.044)
Gender !(1=male) 0.017 0.111* !0.111** !0.002 !0.511*** 0.037 0.192 !0.203
(0.047) (0.059) (0.056) (0.048) (0.061) (0.042) (0.119) (0.299)
Birth0Order0 (1=first) !0.026 0.036 !0.011 0.010 !0.012 !0.012 0.041 !0.236
(0.026) (0.033) (0.028) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.051) (0.162)
Enumerator 0.079 !0.123** !0.074 0.117** 0.093 0.063 0.125 !0.195
(0.051) (0.061) (0.056) (0.049) (0.063) (0.049) (0.078) (0.250)
Researcher !0.0956* 0.013 !0.012 0.032 0.027 !0.0926* 0.017 !0.247
(0.049) (0.062) (0.056) (0.046) (0.061) (0.048) (0.079) (0.257)
Size0of0Family 0.0414* 0.021 0.019 !0.030 0.007 0.020 0.007 0.088
(0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.021) (0.040) (0.139)
Treated0household 0.112 !0.038 0.034 0.022 0.199* 0.279*** !1.175*** 2.481***
(0.104) (0.119) (0.109) (0.102) (0.119) (0.100) (0.208) (0.475)
Mother0Job0Type 0.001 0.019 !0.016 !0.019 !0.035 0.038 !0.004 !0.052
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.043) (0.045) (0.040) (0.034) (0.050) (0.037) (0.063) (0.199)
Father0Job0Type !0.023 !0.017 !0.055 !0.021 0.117** 0.023 !0.011 0.189
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.059) (0.058) (0.057) (0.049) (0.058) (0.047) (0.079) (0.269)
House0Quality0Index0 0.0875** !0.001 0.041 0.027 !0.038 0.035 !0.006 0.209
(Scale!5=10) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.033) (0.056) (0.168)
FE,0dS20(dummy) 0.134** 0.187** !0.098 !0.076 0.160** 0.108 0.228** !0.405
(0.065) (0.085) (0.078) (0.064) (0.079) (0.068) (0.115) (0.374)
FE,0dS3!(dummy) 0.033 !0.058 0.142* 0.181** !0.063 !0.041 !0.118 0.552
(0.081) (0.087) (0.082) (0.074) (0.091) (0.068) (0.114) (0.341)
FE,0dYear0(dummy) 0.100 0.159 !0.212** !0.201** 0.064 !0.076 0.562*** !1.330***
(0.083) (0.101) (0.091) (0.082) (0.097) (0.082) (0.123) (0.395)
Weak0IV0Test0(F!statistic) 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10
Constant !1.291*** !1.044** !0.358 3.367*** 2.813*** 0.090 1.552*** 6.759***
(0.367) (0.419) (0.437) (0.390) (0.437) (0.339) (0.550) (1.816)
Observations 517 517 517 517 511 449 514 514
Adjusted0R!squared 0.048 0.107 0.012 0.041 0.133 !0.009 0.206 0.142
Age !0.017 !0.017 !0.017 !0.017 !0.017 !0.007 !0.017 !0.017
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.041) (0.024) (0.024)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 517 517 517 517 511 449 514 514












I"feel"that"I'm"a" I"am"able"to"do I"feel"I"do"not On"the"whole, At"times,
person"of"worth, things"as"well"as "have"much"to" I"am"satisfied" "I"think"I
on"an"equal"plane most"other" be"proud"of** with"myself am"not"good"
VARIABLES with"others. people. at"all**
spn !0.168 !0.099 !0.00868 !0.185 0.117
!(1,!sponsor;!0,!no!sponsor) (0.213) (0.202) (0.188) (0.240) (0.213)
Age 0.0356** !0.00763 0.0486*** !0.0239 0.0438***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Gender !(1=male) 0.121 0.146 !0.0317 !0.106 0.0103
(0.097) (0.090) (0.083) (0.090) (0.092)
Birth"Order0 (1=first) !0.0122 !0.0373 !0.116** !0.00238 0.0687
(0.055) (0.052) (0.047) (0.051) (0.049)
Enumerator 0.295*** 0.0431 !0.0523 0.345*** !0.142
(0.101) (0.096) (0.086) (0.093) (0.089)
Researcher !0.0435 !0.00313 !0.0974 !0.215** !0.0974
(0.100) (0.099) (0.086) (0.089) (0.084)
Size"of"Family 0.063 0.0484 0.0559 0.0591 !0.0177
(0.051) (0.052) (0.045) (0.048) (0.041)
Treated"household 0.0571 0.0573 0.122 0.207 0.0956
(0.194) (0.193) (0.173) (0.208) (0.189)
Mother"Job"Type 0.140* 0.0429 !0.00905 !0.0178 !0.113
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.078) (0.078) (0.069) (0.068) (0.072)
Father"Job"Type !0.139 !0.0699 !0.0592 !0.0756 0.208**
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.113) (0.109) (0.108) (0.092) (0.096)
House"Quality"Index0 0.153** 0.0919 0.102* 0.0128 0.085
(Scale!5=10) (0.070) (0.069) (0.058) (0.075) (0.060)
FE,0dS20(dummy) 0.0709 0.103 0.131 0.203* 0.146
(0.124) (0.131) (0.120) (0.121) (0.126)
FE,0dS3!(dummy) 0.000 0.301* !0.076 0.070 !0.059
(0.162) (0.154) (0.124) (0.141) (0.120)
FE,0dYear0(dummy) 0.0444 !0.094 0.0855 0.254* 0.178
(0.162) (0.155) (0.139) (0.150) (0.141)
Weak"IV"Test"(F!statistic) 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10
Constant !2.197*** !0.996 !1.421** !0.262 !1.660***
(0.717) (0.656) (0.638) (0.717) (0.633)
Observations 517 517 517 517 517
Adjusted0R!squared 0.029 !0.007 0.050 0.033 0.029
Age !0.017 !0.017 !0.017 !0.017 !0.017
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 517 517 517 517 511
R!squared 0.602 0.602 0.602 0.602 0.602
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




























spn !0.059 !0.246* !0.136 !0.098 !0.159 !0.110













Gender !(1=male) 0.017 0.020 0.013 0.007 0.011 0.012
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Birth0Order/ (1=first) !0.026 !0.032 !0.0500** !0.039 !0.0518** !0.0478*
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Enumerator 0.079 0.071 0.077 0.072 0.076 0.077
(0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
Researcher !0.0956* !0.0943* !0.0933* !0.0932* !0.0924* !0.0947*
(0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050)
Size0of0Family 0.0414* 0.0436* 0.0594** 0.0514** 0.0607** 0.0579**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Treated0household 0.112 0.241** 0.212* 0.162 0.230** 0.193*
(0.104) (0.107) (0.119) (0.104) (0.112) (0.116)
Mother0Job0Type 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.004
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
Father0Job0Type !0.023 !0.022 !0.033 !0.031 !0.037 !0.032
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.059) (0.061) (0.060) (0.058) (0.062) (0.061)
House0Quality0Index/ 0.0875** 0.0918** 0.0803** 0.0803** 0.0786** 0.0803**
(Scale!5C10) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
FE,/dS2/(dummy) 0.134** 0.134** 0.165** 0.155** 0.168** 0.163**
(0.065) (0.067) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065)
FE,/dS3!(dummy) 0.033 0.059 0.046 0.046 0.049 0.042
(0.081) (0.083) (0.083) (0.081) (0.084) (0.084)
FE,/dYear/(dummy) 0.100 0.053 0.109 0.105 0.109 0.113
(0.083) (0.087) (0.087) (0.083) (0.085) (0.084)
Weak0IV0Test0(F!statistic) 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10
Constant !1.291*** !1.041*** !1.084*** !1.054*** !1.053*** !1.028**
(0.367) (0.370) (0.373) (0.358) (0.361) (0.426)
Observations 517 517 517 517 517 517
Adjusted/R!squared 0.048 0.036 0.031 0.043 0.029 0.033




Age !0.017 !0.144 0.122 !0.136 0.076 !0.019
(0.024) (0.078) (0.041) (0.049) (0.086) (0.102)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 517 517 517 517 517 517
R!squared 0.602 0.605 0.609 0.608 0.602 0.602
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel&B&includes&same&controls&as&Panel&A
$Panel$B,$Table$5:$First$Stage$for$Sponsored$(spn)















spn 0.169 0.365* 0.155
!(1,!sponsor;!0,!no!sponsor) )0.192 )0.188 )0.179
Age 0.0745*** 0.101*** 0.0251*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Gender !(1=male) 0.0498 )0.0439 0.268***
)0.078 )0.083 )0.085
Birth)Order0 (1=first) 0.0569 0.0878* )0.0175
(0.044) (0.046) (0.050)
Enumerator 0.234*** 0.123 )0.597***
(0.087) (0.082) (0.082)
Researcher 0.0145 )0.0338 0.0437
(0.085) (0.084) (0.082)
Size)of)Family 0.00396 )0.0063 0.0531
(0.039) (0.041) (0.043)
Treated)household 0.139 )0.104 )0.147
(0.174) (0.165) (0.157)
Mother)Job)Type )0.108 0.0549 0.106*
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.070) (0.062) (0.061)
Father)Job)Type )0.111 0.0196 0.0404
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.088) (0.068) (0.085)
House)Quality)Index0 0.0768 0.0306 )0.0884
(Scale!5=10) (0.065) (0.048) (0.056)
FE,0dS20(dummy) 0.268** 0.194 0.112
(0.119) (0.118) (0.124)
FE,0dS3!(dummy) )0.156 )0.183 0.109
(0.119) (0.115) (0.114)
FE,0dYear0(dummy) 0.277* 0.209 0.0223
(0.145) (0.139) (0.139)
Weak)IV)Test)(F)statistic) 20.10 20.10 20.10
Constant )1.787*** )1.893*** 0.164
(0.622) (0.516) (0.548)
Observations 517 517 517
Adjusted0R)squared 0.109 0.106 0.108
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses 
Answers coded, 4=Strongly Agree, 3=Agree, 2=Disagree, 1=Strongly Disagree
Table)6)
IV0Estimations,0Hopefulness0About0the0Future)Site0Fixed0Effects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel)A:)TwoPStage)Least)Squares
Age !0.017 !0.017 !0.017
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 517 517 517
R!squared 0.602 0.602 0.602
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses 
Panel&B&includes&same&controls&as&Panel&A
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
$Panel$B,$Table$6:$First$Stage$for$Sponsored$(spn)
















spn 0.215 &0.217 0.172 0.147 0.056 0.154













Gender !(1=male) 0.111* 0.112* 0.091 0.084 0.097 0.095
(0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061)
Birth/Order- (1=first) 0.036 0.004 &0.027 &0.006 &0.027 &0.018
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Enumerator &0.123** &0.141** &0.128** &0.139** &0.130** &0.126**
(0.061) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063)
Researcher 0.013 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.017 0.011
(0.062) (0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.065) (0.065)
Size/of/Family 0.021 0.041 0.0694** 0.0527* 0.0676** 0.0630**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Treated/household &0.038 0.305*** 0.124 0.081 0.203* 0.129
(0.119) (0.117) (0.134) (0.116) (0.122) (0.132)
Mother/Job/Type 0.019 0.028 0.025 0.020 0.028 0.028
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.045) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047)
Father/Job/Type &0.017 &0.025 &0.044 &0.042 &0.040 &0.035
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.058) (0.060) (0.064) (0.061) (0.066) (0.064)
House/Quality/Index- &0.001 0.000 &0.026 &0.022 &0.022 &0.017
(Scale!5C10) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045)
FE,-dS2-(dummy) 0.187** 0.218** 0.278*** 0.251*** 0.274*** 0.254***
(0.085) (0.087) (0.090) (0.088) (0.090) (0.090)
FE,-dS3!(dummy) &0.058 0.003 &0.040 &0.028 &0.031 &0.048
(0.087) (0.092) (0.091) (0.088) (0.092) (0.092)
FE,-dYear-(dummy) 0.159 0.080 0.222** 0.187* 0.196* 0.202*
(0.101) (0.110) (0.109) (0.104) (0.108) (0.108)
Weak/IV/Test/(F&statistic) 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10
Constant &1.044** &0.348 &0.326 &0.374 &0.403 &0.069
(0.419) (0.423) (0.429) (0.408) (0.434) (0.432)
Observations 517 517 517 517 517 517
Adjusted-R&squared 0.107 0.081 0.042 0.083 0.046 0.048




Age !0.017 !0.144 0.122 !0.136 0.076 !0.019
(0.024) (0.078) (0.041) (0.049) (0.086) (0.102)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 517 517 517 517 517 517
R!squared 0.602 0.605 0.609 0.608 0.602 0.602
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses 
Panel&B&includes&same&controls&as&Panel&A
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
$Panel$B,$Table$7:$First$Stage$for$Sponsored$(spn)
























spn 0.216 0.008 '0.513**
!(1,!sponsor;!0,!no!sponsor) (0.202) (0.207) (0.203)
Age 0.012 0.0461*** 0.012
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
Gender !(1=male) '0.010 '0.062 '0.267***
(0.087) (0.093) (0.086)
Birth0Order0 (1=first) '0.005 '0.075 0.043
(0.041) (0.049) (0.048)
Enumerator 0.156* '0.327*** '0.092
(0.090) (0.090) (0.088)
Researcher '0.162* 0.000 0.142
(0.090) (0.089) (0.091)
Size0of0Family 0.023 0.006 0.027
(0.040) (0.046) (0.046)
Treated0household '0.110 0.097 0.133
(0.154) (0.183) (0.196)
Mother0Job0Type '0.051 '0.019 0.026
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.067) (0.071) (0.071)
Father0Job0Type '0.098 '0.189* 0.117
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.094) (0.100) (0.092)
House0Quality0Index0 0.037 0.104 '0.012
(Scale!5=10) (0.069) (0.065) (0.062)
FE,0dS20(dummy) '0.236* 0.048 '0.081
(0.127) (0.124) (0.139)
FE,0dS3!(dummy) 0.149 '0.038 0.301**
(0.124) (0.136) (0.122)
FE,0dYear0(dummy) '0.146 '0.051 '0.433***
(0.148) (0.149) (0.139)
Weak0IV0Test0(F'statistic) 20.10 20.10 20.10
Constant '0.236 '0.770 '0.110
(0.750) (0.711) (0.661)
Observations 517 517 517
Adjusted0R'squared '0.003 0.052 0.017
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Answers coded 2=can be trusted, try to be helpful, 1= can't be too careful, looking out for themselves 




Age !0.017 !0.017 !0.017
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 517 517 517
R!squared 0.602 0.602 0.602
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses 
Panel&B&includes&same&controls&as&Panel&A
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
$Panel$B,$Table$8:$First$Stage$for$Sponsored$(spn)






















spn !0.089 !0.220 !0.098 !0.110 !0.050 !0.043













Gender !(1=male) !0.111** !0.112** !0.118** !0.118** !0.113** !0.117**
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Birth.Order/ (1=first) !0.011 !0.025 !0.034 !0.031 !0.025 !0.023
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Enumerator !0.074 !0.080 !0.076 !0.077 !0.076 !0.073
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Researcher !0.012 !0.010 !0.010 !0.009 !0.016 !0.018
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Size.of.Family 0.019 0.029 0.037 0.035 0.029 0.030
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Treated.household 0.034 0.148 0.088 0.088 0.046 0.043
(0.109) (0.109) (0.125) (0.109) (0.114) (0.117)
Mother.Job.Type !0.016 !0.012 !0.014 !0.014 !0.016 !0.013
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
Father.Job.Type !0.055 !0.059 !0.064 !0.065 !0.050 !0.055
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058)
House.Quality.Index/ 0.041 0.040 0.032 0.033 0.037 0.039
(Scale!5C10) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
FE,/dS2/(dummy) !0.098 !0.082 !0.065 !0.069 !0.077 !0.088
(0.078) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.078)
FE,/dS3!(dummy) 0.142* 0.162** 0.148* 0.151* 0.138 0.134
(0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.085) (0.083)
FE,/dYear/(dummy) !0.212** !0.230** !0.188** !0.195** !0.192** !0.193**
(0.091) (0.093) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.091)
Weak.IV.Test.(F!statistic) 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10
Constant !0.358 !0.107 !0.097 !0.121 !0.157 0.193
(0.437) (0.428) (0.431) (0.428) (0.425) (0.429)
Observations 517 517 517 517 517 517
Adjusted/R!squared 0.012 !0.006 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.010




Age !0.017 !0.144 0.122 !0.136 0.076 !0.019
(0.024) (0.078) (0.041) (0.049) (0.086) (0.102)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 517 517 517 517 517 517
R!squared 0.602 0.605 0.609 0.608 0.602 0.602
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel&B&includes&same&controls&as&Panel&A
$Panel$B,$Table$9:$First$Stage$for$Sponsored$(spn)











Variable SPN obs NON-SPN obs *diff 
What level of education does 3.741 286 3.679 234 0.062
 your mother expect you to achieve? (0.747) (0.841) (0.071)
What level of education does 3.773 286 3.615 234 0.157**
 your father expect you to achieve? (0.593) (0.784) (0.062)
What level of education do 3.730 285 3.620 234 0.110*
your siblings expect you to achieve? (0.677) (0.805) (0.066)
What level of education would you say 3.828 285 3.782 234 0.046
is sufficient in order for one to be successful today? (0.499) (0.641) (0.051)
What level of education do 3.815 286 3.671 234 0.144***
 you realistically expect that you will achieve? (0.500) (0.627) (0.051)
What age is a good age to get married? 25.449 283 25.064 233 0.384
(3.874) (4.006) (0.349)
How many children 2.323 285 2.530 234 /0.207
is a good number of children to have? (1.459) (2.755) (0.200)
What level of education does the staff at Compassion 3.843
expect you to achieve? (0.516)
What level of education does your foreign sponsor 3.874
expect you to achieve? (0.464)
SPN & NON-SPN, Standard deviation in parentheses
For *diff, Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Answers coded, 1=primaryschool, 2=middleschool, 3=secondschool, 4=college, 5=gradschool
Table 10
Expectations- Summary Statistics










































spn-(1#=#sponsor;#0#=#no#sponsor) !0.034 !0.110 !0.105 0.083 0.140 !0.723 !0.909*
(0.125) (0.110) (0.105) (0.106) (0.102) (0.784) (0.496)
Age 0.0376*** 0.0370*** 0.0467*** 0.0312*** 0.0234*** 0.040 !0.041
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.059) (0.029)
Gender #(1=male) 0.001 0.019 !0.030 0.067 !0.002 0.295 0.398**
(0.063) (0.060) (0.060) (0.051) (0.048) (0.352) (0.178)
Birth-Order0 (1=first) !0.011 !0.014 !0.004 !0.008 0.010 !0.116 0.188
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.020) (0.024) (0.148) (0.129)
Enumerator !0.054 0.026 0.009 !0.045 0.117** 0.269 !0.618***
(0.072) (0.063) (0.064) (0.052) (0.049) (0.369) (0.222)
Researcher 0.075 0.051 0.025 0.030 0.032 !0.225 !0.057
(0.068) (0.060) (0.062) (0.051) (0.046) (0.313) (0.211)
Size-of-Family 0.048 !0.002 !0.020 0.009 !0.030 !0.021 !0.053
(0.034) (0.030) (0.033) (0.022) (0.027) (0.149) (0.088)
Treated-household 0.137 0.258** 0.267** !0.056 0.022 1.164 0.346
(0.147) (0.124) (0.118) (0.104) (0.102) (0.711) (0.322)
Mother-Job-Type !0.042 !0.023 !0.006 !0.045 !0.019 0.208 0.042
(3=Skilled;#2=Semiskilled,#1=Unskilled)# (0.062) (0.047) (0.050) (0.040) (0.034) (0.307) (0.113)
Father-Job-Type !0.017 0.074 0.082 !0.086 !0.021 !0.363 0.285
(3=Skilled;#2=Semiskilled,#1=Unskilled)# (0.078) (0.073) (0.066) (0.060) (0.049) (0.324) (0.287)
House-Quality-Index0(Scale#5=10) !0.028 0.054 0.053 0.0803* 0.027 0.715** !0.097
(0.052) (0.047) (0.045) (0.042) (0.040) (0.297) (0.190)
FE,0dS20(dummy) !0.082 !0.049 !0.103 0.011 !0.076 !0.089 0.125
(0.085) (0.076) (0.075) (0.064) (0.064) (0.436) (0.300)
FE,0dS3#(dummy) 0.307** 0.253** 0.373*** 0.188** 0.181** !0.659 0.327
(0.123) (0.105) (0.106) (0.088) (0.074) (0.550) (0.200)
FE,0dYear0(dummy) !0.292** !0.319*** !0.442*** !0.172* !0.201** 0.301 !0.509**
(0.127) (0.113) (0.111) (0.101) (0.082) (0.683) (0.257)
Weak-IV-Test-(F!statistic) 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10
Constant 3.405*** 2.666*** 2.660*** 2.950*** 3.367*** 18.61*** 3.512*
(0.494) (0.509) (0.463) (0.420) (0.390) (2.509) (1.882)
Observations 517 517 516 516 517 513 516
Adjusted0R!squared 0.050 0.054 0.089 0.041 0.041 0.001 0.013
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Answers coded, 1=primaryschool, 2=middleschool, 3=secondschool, 4=college, 5=gradschool
Two-Stage Least Squares, Reference Points-Site Fixed Effects
Table 11
Panel-A:-TwoNStage-Least-Squares
Age !0.017 !0.144 0.122 !0.136 0.076 !0.019 !0.019
(0.024) (0.078) (0.041) (0.049) (0.086) (0.102) (0.102)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 517 517 517 517 517 517 517
R!squared 0.602 0.605 0.609 0.608 0.602 0.602 0.602
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel&B&includes&same&controls&as&Panel&A
$Panel$B,$Table$11:$First$Stage$for$Sponsored$(spn)
















Variable SPN obs NON-SPN obs *diff 
Time preference 0.313 246 0.340 206 &0.027
(1 chocolate one week from today=0 (0.465) (0.640) (0.044)
3 chocolates one month and week from today=1)
Trust Game Player A 3.212 283 2.150 234 1.062***
(of the 3 endowed chocolates, (1.298) (1.444) (0.122)
how many you want to give 0,1,2,3)
Trust Game Player B 6.491 283 8.829 234 &2.338***
(of the 3 endowed + X*3 chocolates, (3.750) (2.923) (0.294)
how many you want to give back to A  0 - 9)
SPN & NON-SPN, Standard deviation in parentheses
For *diff, Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12
Time Preference and Trust Game-Summary Statistics
















mean%dep%variable 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325
(std.%dev) (0.469) (0.469) (0.469) (0.469) (0.469) (0.469)
spn 90.327*** 90.156 90.255** 90.277** 90.306*** 90.267**













Gender !(1=male) 0.037 0.037 0.043 0.044 0.041 0.042
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Birth-Order% (1=first) 90.012 0.004 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.011
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Enumerator 0.063 0.071 0.070 0.072 0.068 0.068
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Researcher 90.0926* 90.0939** 90.0974** 90.0967** 90.0947* 90.0960**
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Size-of-Family 0.020 0.008 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.001
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Treated-household 0.279*** 0.129 0.168* 0.200** 0.211** 0.178*
(0.100) (0.090) (0.101) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095)
Mother-Job-Type 0.038 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.034
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
Father-Job-Type 0.023 0.030 0.036 0.035 0.027 0.033
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
House-Quality-Index% 0.035 0.034 0.044 0.042 0.041 0.042
(Scale!5C10) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
FE,%dS2%(dummy) 0.108 0.096 0.082 0.087 0.085 0.087
(0.068) (0.069) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073)
FE,%dS3!(dummy) 90.041 90.061 90.050 90.048 90.046 90.048
(0.068) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.066)
FE,%dYear%(dummy) 90.076 90.044 90.080 90.077 90.086 90.080
(0.082) (0.081) (0.084) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083)
Weak-IV-Test-(F9statistic) 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10
Constant 0.090 90.181 90.213 90.189 90.169 90.289
(0.339) (0.315) (0.326) (0.327) (0.325) (0.350)
Observations 449 449 449 449 449 449
Adjusted%R9squared 90.009 0.020 90.012 90.014 90.023 90.015
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses 
Time Preference question:
Do you prefer 1 chocolate in 1 week from today or 3 chocolates in one month and one week from today 
Table-13
IV%Estimations%at%different%ages,%%Time%Preference%9Site%Fixed%Effects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel-A:-TwoNStage-Least-Squares
Age !0.007 !0.143 0.128 !0.144 0.082 !0.083
(0.041) (0.083) (0.044) (0.052) (0.093) (0.113)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 449 449 449 449 449 449
R!squared 0.598 0.600 0.605 0.605 0.598 0.602
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel&B&includes&same&controls&as&Panel&A
$Panel$B,$Table$13:$First$Stage$for$Sponsored$(spn)
















mean%dep%variable 2.731 2.731 2.731 2.731 2.731 2.731
(std.%dev) (1.464) (1.464) (1.464) (1.464) (1.464) (1.464)
spn 1.669*** 1.217*** 1.483*** 1.603*** 1.650*** 1.729***













Gender !(1=male) 0.192 0.194 0.178 0.169 0.180 0.175
(0.119) (0.120) (0.122) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121)
Birth/Order% (1=first) 0.041 0.015 =0.025 =0.009 =0.010 =0.002
(0.051) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055)
Enumerator 0.125 0.106 0.120 0.115 0.120 0.126
(0.078) (0.077) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
Researcher 0.017 0.020 0.023 0.024 0.015 0.008
(0.079) (0.077) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082)
Size/of/Family 0.007 0.022 0.056 0.046 0.044 0.042
(0.040) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
Treated/household =1.175*** =0.835*** =0.918*** =1.038*** =1.044*** =1.103***
(0.208) (0.174) (0.217) (0.195) (0.198) (0.200)
Mother/Job/Type =0.004 0.005 0.007 =0.001 =0.001 0.002
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.063) (0.061) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065)
Father/Job/Type =0.011 =0.015 =0.039 =0.037 =0.018 =0.020
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.079) (0.078) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083)
House/Quality/Index% =0.006 =0.001 =0.026 =0.026 =0.022 =0.016
(Scale!5C10) (0.056) (0.054) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
FE,%dS2%(dummy) 0.228** 0.249** 0.316*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.273**
(0.115) (0.109) (0.108) (0.110) (0.111) (0.113)
FE,%dS3!(dummy) =0.118 =0.053 =0.087 =0.092 =0.110 =0.129
(0.114) (0.113) (0.119) (0.118) (0.119) (0.120)
FE,%dYear%(dummy) 0.562*** 0.467*** 0.595*** 0.599*** 0.610*** 0.613***
(0.123) (0.126) (0.122) (0.120) (0.122) (0.123)
Weak/IV/Test/(F=statistic) 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10
Constant 1.552*** 2.231*** 2.149*** 2.187*** 2.130*** 2.779***
(0.550) (0.502) (0.530) (0.534) (0.527) (0.567)
Observations 514 514 514 514 514 514
Adjusted%R=squared 0.206 0.189 0.188 0.194 0.193 0.197
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses 
Table/14
IV%Estimations%at%different%ages,%%Player%A%=Site%Fixed%Effects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel/A:/TwoNStage/Least/Squares
Age !0.017 !0.140 0.120 !0.134 0.075 !0.018
(0.024) (0.078) (0.042) (0.049) (0.086) (0.102)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 514 514 514 514 514 514
R!squared 0.601 0.604 0.608 0.607 0.602 0.601
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel&B&includes&same&controls&as&Panel&A
$Panel$B,$Table$14:$First$Stage$for$Sponsored$(spn)
















mean%dep%variable 7.549 7.549 7.549 7.549 7.549 7.549
(std.%dev) (3.592) (3.592) (3.592) (3.592) (3.592) (3.592)
spn 83.891*** 83.788*** 83.790*** 83.906*** 83.755*** 83.808***













Gender !(1=male) 80.203 80.206 80.206 80.197 80.195 80.199
(0.299) (0.299) (0.300) (0.299) (0.298) (0.298)
Birth/Order% (1=first) 80.236 80.234 80.215 80.223 80.209 80.214
(0.162) (0.159) (0.153) (0.155) (0.155) (0.157)
Enumerator 80.195 80.190 80.197 80.194 80.193 80.192
(0.250) (0.249) (0.250) (0.250) (0.250) (0.250)
Researcher 80.247 80.249 80.251 80.249 80.254 80.252
(0.257) (0.257) (0.257) (0.258) (0.257) (0.258)
Size/of/Family 0.088 0.087 0.071 0.077 0.066 0.072
(0.139) (0.139) (0.134) (0.134) (0.136) (0.137)
Treated/household 2.481*** 2.419*** 2.380*** 2.468*** 2.346*** 2.388***
(0.475) (0.410) (0.517) (0.440) (0.451) (0.454)
Mother/Job/Type 80.052 80.053 80.058 80.052 80.059 80.055
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.199) (0.197) (0.199) (0.199) (0.199) (0.197)
Father/Job/Type 0.189 0.188 0.199 0.196 0.212 0.201
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.269) (0.268) (0.269) (0.269) (0.270) (0.270)
House/Quality/Index% 0.209 0.204 0.210 0.214 0.218 0.217
(Scale!5C10) (0.168) (0.168) (0.166) (0.167) (0.168) (0.166)
FE,%dS2%(dummy) 80.405 80.401 80.426 80.424 80.439 80.438
(0.374) (0.373) (0.364) (0.368) (0.363) (0.371)
FE,%dS3!(dummy) 0.552 0.536 0.539 0.549 0.530 0.536
(0.341) (0.339) (0.341) (0.341) (0.342) (0.343)
FE,%dYear%(dummy) 81.330*** 81.297*** 81.326*** 81.346*** 81.335*** 81.339***
(0.395) (0.415) (0.406) (0.397) (0.396) (0.396)
Weak/IV/Test/(F8statistic) 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10
Constant 6.759*** 6.587*** 6.710*** 6.604*** 6.564*** 6.756***
(1.816) (1.734) (1.742) (1.746) (1.753) (1.819)
Observations 514 514 514 514 514 514
Adjusted%R8squared 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.142
Clustered standard errors at house holdlevel in parentheses 
Table/15
IV%Estimations%at%different%ages,%%Player%B%8Site%Fixed%Effects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel/A:/TwoNStage/Least/Squares
Age !0.017 !0.140 0.120 !0.134 0.075 !0.018
(0.024) (0.078) (0.042) (0.049) (0.086) (0.102)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 514 514 514 514 514 514
R!squared 0.601 0.604 0.608 0.607 0.602 0.601
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel&B&includes&same&controls&as&Panel&A
$Panel$B,$Table$15:$First$Stage$for$Sponsored$(spn)
























spn 0.304* 0.473** 0.013 0.227 )0.134 )0.429** 2.077*** )3.785***
!(1,!sponsor;!0,!no!sponsor) (0.183) (0.229) (0.201) (0.179) (0.206) (0.199) (0.405) (0.984)
Gender !(1=male) 0.009 0.075 )0.0982* 0.011 )0.539*** 0.001 0.159 )0.186
(0.051) (0.067) (0.059) (0.055) (0.066) (0.048) (0.135) (0.335)
Birth0Order0 (1=first) )0.027 0.002 )0.015 )0.013 0.021 )0.002 0.033 )0.332*
(0.029) (0.040) (0.034) (0.029) (0.038) (0.029) (0.066) (0.188)
Enumerator 0.075 )0.097 )0.112* 0.152*** 0.121* 0.090 0.139 )0.286
(0.052) (0.070) (0.060) (0.056) (0.072) (0.056) (0.092) (0.291)
Researcher )0.0936* )0.012 )0.040 0.038 )0.008 )0.0960* 0.025 )0.204
(0.051) (0.069) (0.059) (0.053) (0.069) (0.054) (0.094) (0.297)
Size0of0Family 0.042 0.053 0.011 0.007 )0.022 0.026 0.023 0.170
(0.027) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.025) (0.056) (0.170)
Treated0household )0.099 )0.114 )0.025 0.005 0.117 0.330** )1.481*** 2.563***
(0.161) (0.186) (0.167) (0.159) (0.183) (0.164) (0.334) (0.777)
Mother0Job0Type )0.019 0.040 )0.006 )0.022 )0.040 0.033 0.010 )0.212
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.040) (0.049) (0.044) (0.037) (0.059) (0.041) (0.081) (0.240)
Father0Job0Type 0.002 )0.021 0.000 )0.043 0.131* 0.022 )0.011 0.364
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.065) (0.072) (0.065) (0.058) (0.067) (0.052) (0.102) (0.330)
House0Quality0Index0 0.0651* )0.063 0.030 0.024 )0.051 0.057 )0.031 0.259
(Scale!5=10) (0.037) (0.052) (0.045) (0.045) (0.049) (0.039) (0.068) (0.194)
FE,0dS20(dummy) 0.140** 0.265*** )0.100 )0.056 0.138 0.097 0.236* )0.238
(0.066) (0.095) (0.082) (0.072) (0.092) (0.079) (0.140) (0.420)
FE,0dS3!(dummy) )0.004 )0.110 0.064 0.197** )0.092 )0.018 )0.231 0.643
(0.081) (0.099) (0.089) (0.088) (0.104) (0.075) (0.142) (0.432)
FE,0dYear0(dummy) 0.090 0.273** )0.152* )0.176* 0.089 )0.117 0.644*** )1.368***
(0.083) (0.111) (0.092) (0.091) (0.104) (0.089) (0.135) (0.446)
Weak0IV0Test0(F)statistic) 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10 20.10
Constant )0.928*** )0.117 )0.101 3.441*** 2.906*** )0.370 2.274*** 5.665***
(0.335) (0.488) (0.476) (0.424) (0.501) (0.378) (0.631) (1.968)
Observations 444 444 444 444 439 384 441 441
Adjusted0R)squared )0.005 0.011 )0.008 0.027 0.149 )4.000 0.187 0.114
Age )0.004 )0.004 )0.004 )0.004 )0.003 0.006 )0.004 )0.004
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 444 444 444 444 439 384 441 441
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Age %0.017 %0.017 %0.017 %0.017 %0.017 %0.007 %0.017 %0.017
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.041) (0.024) (0.024)
Gender !(1=male) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029)
Birth4Order* (1=first) %0.018 %0.018 %0.018 %0.018 %0.018 %0.010 %0.018 %0.018
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Enumerator %0.007 %0.007 %0.007 %0.007 %0.007 0.007 %0.006 %0.006
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030)
Researcher 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 %0.007 0.003 0.003
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030)
Size4of4Family %0.004 %0.004 %0.004 %0.004 %0.004 %0.003 %0.004 %0.004
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Treated4household 0.689*** 0.689*** 0.689*** 0.689*** 0.689*** 0.705*** 0.686*** 0.686***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036)
Mother4Job4Type 0.0408** 0.0408** 0.0408** 0.0408** 0.0408** 0.021 0.042** 0.042**
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023)
Father4Job4Type %0.020 %0.020 %0.020 %0.020 %0.020 %0.015 %0.020 %0.020
(3,Skilled;!2,Semiskill,!1Unskill)! (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031)
House4Quality4Index* %0.008 %0.008 %0.008 %0.008 %0.008 %0.006 %0.008 %0.008
(Scale!5:10) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
FE,*dS2*(dummy) %0.012 %0.012 %0.012 %0.012 %0.012 %0.013 %0.014 %0.014
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041)
FE,*dS3!(dummy) 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.109*** 0.118*** 0.118***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
FE,*dYear*(dummy) %0.248*** %0.248*** %0.248*** %0.248*** %0.248*** %0.210 %0.248*** %0.248***
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.173) (0.110) (0.110)
IV,4age4at4sponsorhip*≤!:3 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.310 0.103 0.103
(0.374) (0.374) (0.374) (0.374) (0.374) (0.604) (0.374) (0.374)
IV,4age4at4sponsorhip4*%2 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.263 0.082 0.082
(0.342) (0.342) (0.342) (0.342) (0.342) (0.551) (0.342) (0.342)
IV,4age4at4sponsorhip4!:1 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.333 0.261 0.261
(0.320) (0.320) (0.320) (0.320) (0.320) (0.511) (0.320) (0.320)
IV,4age4at4sponsorhip4!0 0.423** 0.423** 0.423** 0.423** 0.423** 0.548 0.415 0.415
(0.292) (0.292) (0.292) (0.292) (0.292) (0.466) (0.292) (0.292)
IV,4age4at4sponsorhip441 0.404** 0.404** 0.404** 0.404** 0.404** 0.481 0.401 0.401
(0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.427) (0.270) (0.270)
IV,4age4at4sponsorhip442 0.542*** 0.542*** 0.542*** 0.542*** 0.542*** 0.631 0.539** 0.539**
(0.245) (0.245) (0.245) (0.245) (0.245) (0.385) (0.245) (0.245)
IV,4age4at4sponsorhip443 0.589*** 0.589*** 0.589*** 0.589*** 0.589*** 0.646*** 0.586*** 0.586***
(0.220) (0.220) (0.220) (0.220) (0.220) (0.344) (0.221) (0.221)
IV,4age4at4sponsorhip4!4 0.662*** 0.662*** 0.662*** 0.662*** 0.662*** 0.719*** 0.656*** 0.656***
(0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.305) (0.198) (0.198)
Table417
First*Stage*for*Sponsored*(spn)%Site*Fixed*Effects












































IV,-age-at-sponsorhip--5 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.713*** 0.668*** 0.668***
(0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.265) (0.176) (0.176)
IV,-age-at-sponsorhip--6 0.658*** 0.658*** 0.658*** 0.658*** 0.658*** 0.696*** 0.651*** 0.651***
(0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.228) (0.157) (0.157)
IV,-age-at-sponsorhip-7 0.618*** 0.618*** 0.618*** 0.618*** 0.618*** 0.652*** 0.617*** 0.617***
(0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.189) (0.135) (0.135)
IV,-age-at-sponsorhip--8 0.641*** 0.641*** 0.641*** 0.641*** 0.641*** 0.677*** 0.640*** 0.640***
(0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.157) (0.122) (0.122)
IV,-age-at-sponsorhip--9 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.300*** 0.305*** 0.305***
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.134) (0.114) (0.114)
Constant %0.051 %0.051 %0.051 %0.051 %0.051 %0.282 %0.050 %0.050
(0.541) (0.541) (0.541) (0.541) (0.541) (0.845) (0.541) (0.541)
Observations 517 517 517 517 517 449 514 514
Adjusted*R%squared 0.581 0.581 0.581 0.581 0.581 0.573 0.580 0.580
Clustered standard errors at household level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table*17,*cont.*First*Stage*for*Sponsored*(spn)%Site*Fixed*Effects
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The P Game  
(1 chocolate in 1 week vs. 3 chocolates in 1 Month and 1 week) 
 
In this game, we are going to give you some chocolates, but  you have two options to choose 
from:  
 
• Option number 1: I will give you 1 chocolate in one week from today 
 
• Option number 2: I will give you 3 chocolates in one month and a week from today 
If you choose Option number 1 you will receive 1 chocolate in one week from today and we 
will put the chocolate in this paper bag with your name on (show the paper bag). Then you can 
have it. In the meantime your mentor will keep the paper bag in his office and she/he will give 
you the chocolate in one week from today.  
If you choose Option number 2 you will receive 3 chocolates in one month and a week from 
today and we will put the chocolates in this paper bag with your name on (show the paper bag). 
Then you can have it. In the meantime your mentor will keep the paper bag in his office and 
she/he will give you the chocolate in in one month and a week from today.  
 
Questions to check the children’s comprehension of the payoff implications of different 
choices. 
If you choose Option number 1, how many chocolates will you get?  
When can you have the chocolates? 
If you choose Option number 2, how many chocolates will you get?  
When can you have the chocolates? 
 
Finally ,  before we play the game ask the following:  
Do you have any questions? … 
 
Tick in the answer-sheet how many seconds it  took the child to decide. 
 
Tick in the answer-sheet which of the two options the child chose.  
 
Saying good-bye 
You did a super job!  Please remember not to talk to the others about the game until all the kids 












Child Name ______________ 
 
Sponsored     Yes ☐    No ☐ 
 
Sibling of Sponsored   Yes ☐    No ☐ 
 
Waitlisted children    Yes ☐    No ☐ 
 





Please check one of the following options: 
 
1 chocolate in 1 week       ☐ 
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For this game, we are going to give you 3 chocolates. We will also are going to give your 
brother/sister 3 chocolates. 
Now, you can keep the 3 chocolates we gave you, or you can give 0,1,2 or 3 chocolates to your 
brother/sister.   
If you give your chocolates to your brother/sister, I am going to give him/her two additional 
chocolates for every chocolate you give to your brother/sister. 
Your brother/sister will then have the choice of giving you back no chocolates or he/she can 
give you back 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, or 9 chocolates depending on how many chocolates you gave to 
him/her.  
So, again, you can keep the 3 chocolates or you can give it to your brother/sister.  If you give 
the chocolate to your brother/sister, I will give him/her two additional chocolates for every 
chocolate you give to your brother/sister. 
Then, your brother/sister can give you back no chocolates, or he/she could give you back 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, or 9 chocolates depending on how many chocolates you gave to him/her.   
 
Is everything clear?  
 
Do you understand?   
 
Do you have any questions?   
 




IF PLAYER A KEEPS CHOCOLATE, END OF GAME – GIVE PLAYER B 3 
CHOCOLATES FOR PARTICIPATION. 
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Decision-sheet PLAYER A  
 
PLAYER A Name ____________ play against    PLAYER B Name ______________ 
 
 
Sponsored     Yes ☐    No ☐ 
 
Sibling of Sponsored   Yes ☐    No ☐ 
 
Waitlisted children    Yes ☐    No ☐ 
 
Sibling of waitlisted children  Yes ☐    No ☐ 
 
 







Remember that this amount will be tripled before reaching Player B. Player B will then decide 


















For this game, we are going to give you 3 chocolates.  
Now, we also gave your brother/sister 3 chocolates and he/she has decided to give you X 
chocolates of his/her 3 chocolates so we could give you two additional chocolates. 
So, you now have X chocolates. You can keep all of the chocolates, or you can give back to your 
brother/sister 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, or 9 chocolates.   
Again, you can keep all the chocolates, or you could give back to your brother/sister 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, or 9 chocolates.    
 
Is everything clear?  
 
Do you understand?   
 
Do you have any questions?   
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Decision-sheet PLAYER B  
 
PLAYER B Name ____________  play against   PLAYER A Name ______________ 
 
 
Sponsored     Yes ☐    No ☐ 
 
Sibling of Sponsored   Yes ☐    No ☐ 
 
Waitlisted children    Yes ☐    No ☐ 
 
Sibling of waitlisted children  Yes ☐    No ☐ 
 
 
Player A sent you X chocolates, which had been tripled and you now have 3 extra chocolates in 
addition to your original 3 chocolates. So now you have a total of X chocolates. Please select 
how many, if any, chocolates you would like to send back to Player A by checking one of the 
following boxes.  
 
0 ☐   0 ☐    0 ☐ 
1 ☐   1 ☐   1 ☐ 
2 ☐   2 ☐   2 ☐ 
3 ☐   3 ☐   3 ☐ 
4 ☐   4 ☐ 
5 ☐   5 ☐ 
6 ☐   6 ☐ 
7 ☐ 
8 ☐ 
9 ☐ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
